A Euclidean path integral is used to find an optimal strategy for a firm under a Walrasian system, Pareto optimality and a non-cooperative feedback Nash Equilibrium. We define dynamic optimal strategies and develop a Feynman type path integration method to capture all non-additive convex strategies. We also show that the method can solve the non-linear case, for example Merton-Garman-Hamiltonian system, which the traditional Pontryagin maximum principle cannot solve in closed form. Furthermore, under Walrasian system we are able to solve for the optimal strategy under a linear constraint with a linear objective function with respect to strategy.
Introduction
In this paper we consider dynamic profit maximization over a time interval with finite horizon t > 0. The objective is to find an optimal strategy for a firm in a system whose state dynamics are specified by a stochastic differential equation. The instantaneous profit function we consider depends on the time s, a real-valued measure of the market share of the firm x(s), and the realvalued dynamic strategy of the firm u(s). The profit function is represented by π[s, x(s), u(s)] ∈ R. Here x ∈ X and u ∈ U, where X is a functional space corresponding to the set of all market share trajectories and U is a functional space corresponding to the set of all possible strategies available to the firm. We assume the functional spaces X and U are bounded and complete. The profit over the time interval [0, t] is measured by the stochastic integral t 0 π[s, x(s), u(s)]ds, using the Itô representation of the integral (Øksendal, 2003) . The dynamics of the market share are given by 
where B(s) is Brownian motion process.
In this paper we are interested in calculating three types of equilibria: Walrasian, Pareto and Nash. The Walrasian system is a fundamental market structure in economics, and is the basis of many other market systems (Walras, 1900) . The main assumption under this system is that each firm is small when compared to the entire industry and therefore does not influence the industry price. The industry consists of all the firms, and its price is determined by the entire system. In this system, a single firm can earn at least zero profit in the long run. Therefore, if a single firm wants to survive it has to achieve its average cost (Walras, 1900) . 
with market dynamics defined in Equation (1).
Definition 1 implies that each firm under the Walrasian system faces identical market dynamics. In this case, finding the optimal strategy of a firm corresponds to solving the optimization problem
under the constraint given in Equation (1), and initial condition x(0) = x 0 . Determining Pareto and Nash equilibria requires us to consider the other firms in the industry. Suppose that there are k firms in an economy, where the strategy function of firm ρ is given by u ρ (s) for ρ = 1, ..., k, u ρ ∈ U ρ ⊂ U, where U ρ is the set of all available strategies of firm ρ, and U is the set of all available strategies in the market. Let x ρ (s) be the measure of market share for firm ρ. Let x(s) and u(s) be the vectors containing the elements x ρ (s) and u ρ (s) for ρ = 1, ..., k, respectively. Each firm has a dynamic profit function π ρ [s, x(s), u(s)], with market dynamics specified by 
where µ[s, x(s), u(s)] is an k-dimensional drift function, σ[s, x(s), u(s)] is an k × m-dimensional diffusion function, and B(s) is an m-dimensional Brownian motion process. The initial condition is x(0) = x 0 ∈ R k . Pareto optimality is an economic environment where each player benefits at the expanse of the other players (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . Therefore, Pareto optimality insures the greatest mutual benefit for all of the players simultaneously. Mathematically this is equivalent to maximizing the total dynamic profit, where α ρ is the profit weight corresponding to ρ th firm such that k ρ=1 α ρ = 1.
Definition 2. The strategies u * ∈ U k , constitute a cooperative Pareto Equilibrium for the ρ th firm if
for ρ = 1, ..., k subject to the Equation (4) with initial condition x(0) = x 0 , where α ρ is the profit weight of ρ th firm such that k ρ=1 α ρ = 1.
Assuming π ρ [s, x(s), u(s)] is non-negative and differentiable, Fubini's Theorem implies that the cooperative Pareto equilibrium the optimization problem for the ρ th firm is
subject to Equation (4), with initial condition x(0) = x 0 . In other words, Equation (6) implies that ρ th firm performs its optimization in light of the optimal strategies of the other firms.
Definition 3. In the non-Cooperative feedback Nash framework a set of optimal strategies u * (s) form a non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium if 
and x(0) = x 0 , for ρ = 1, ..., k, wherẽ
Hence, firm ρ has the optimization problem
subject to the constraints in Equations (7) and (8) and initial conditions x(0) = x * (0) = x 0 . Traditionally, these optimization problems are solved by using the Pontryagin principle Pontryagin (1987) after solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. See Bellman (1952 Bellman ( , 2013 ; Bellman and Dreyfus (2015) ; Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) ; Pontryagin (1966) ; Stokey (1989) and Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) . The main problem with this method is that finding a solution often requires obtaining a complicated value function. An alternative method for solving optimal control problems is based on principles from quantum mechanics and path integrals. These methods have previously been used in motor control theory (Kappen, 2005; Theodorou, Buchli and Schaal, 2010; Theodorou, 2011) , and finance (Baaquie, 2007) . There are three mathematical representations of this approach based on partial differential equations, path integrals, and stochastic differential equations (Theodorou, 2011) . Partial differential equations give a macroscopic view of an underlying physical process, while path integrals and stochastic differential equations give a more microscopic view. Furthermore, the Feynman-Kac formula yields a special set of Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equations which are backward parabolic partial differential equations (Kac, 1949) . Only a few problems in finance are directly tractable by Pontryagin maximum principle and solving the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation usually involves solving a system of differential equations which is often a difficult task. The potential advantage of the quantum approach is that a general non-linear system, such as Merton-Garman Hamiltonian, can be impossible to solve analytically. The quantum method allows a different approach to attack these problems and sometimes can give simplified solutions (Baaquie, 2007) . Path integrals are widely used in physics as a method of studying stochastic systems. In finance, path integrals have been used to study the theory of options and interest rates (Linetsky, 1997; Lyasoff, 2004) . A rigorous discussion of the application of different types of quantum path integrals in finance is given in Baaquie (2007) . The idea is that, in quantum mechanics a particle's evolution is random. This is analogous to the evolution of a stock price having non-zero volatility.
Motivated by Baaquie (2007) we consider a firm's real-valued measure of market share as a stochastic process and use the principles of path integral as the basis for our mathematical model. The assumption is that since a firm is a very small part of an industry and an economy, and is subject to many small stochastic perturbations, the movement of its share will behave like a quantum particle in physics. Although these methods have been used in quantum approaches to financial problems we are not aware of their use in stochastic optimization problems for the economic systems studied here.
Main results
Define a non-negative measurable discounted profit function for a single firm as
Assume that π is a finite C ∞ function with respect to x(s) and u(s) where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant discount rate of profit over s ∈ [0, t]. The functioñ π[s, x(s), u(s)] is the actual profit at time s, and is assumed to be quadratic in terms of change in time, non-decreasing in output price, non-increasing in input price, homogeneous of degree one in output and input prices, convex in output and input prices, continuous in output and input prices, and is continuous with respect to s. We assume that x(s) is a time dependent measure of a stochastic market dynamic and the strategy u(s) is a deterministic function of x. Further technical assumptions are given in the Appendix.
To optimize the dynamic profit function Π defined in Definition 1 with respect to the strategy u we need to specify a function g : [0, t] × X → R to favor strategies that respect the dynamics specified by Equation (1). In the standard Lagrangian framework this function is specified as g(s,
where h is a function that specifies the dynamics of the system and λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Proposition 1 (Walrasian Equilibrium). An optimal strategy for maximizing the dynamic profit function Π(u, t) with respect to the control u and constraint dx(s) = µ[s, x(s), u(s)] ds + σ[s, x(s), u(s)] dB(s), with initial condition x(0) = x 0 is the solution of the equation
with respect to u as a function of x and s evaluated at
Example 1. Suppose that a firm under a Walrasian system has the objective function
where ζ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant discount rate over time interval [0, t], p > 0 is constant price, x(s) is the total output, a twice differentiable function of s, c is a positive constant marginal cost, and u is the total expenditure on advertising. Consider market dynamics given by
where a and σ are two positive and finite constants. The negative terms in the drift part of Equation (12) and the objective function reflect the firm's cost of advertising its product as its strategy. The diffusion component of Equation (12) reflects the amount of variation in the system. To apply Proposition 1 we specify g(s, x) to represent the market dynamics. For a fixed positive Lagrangian multiplier λ * let g(s,
Therefore
∂ 2 ∂x∂u f (s, x, u) = −c exp(−ζs) − 2λ * as + σλ * as = D(s).
Equation (10) then implies that an optimal Walrasian strategy for this system is given by
where E(s, x) = p exp(−ρs) + 2λ * asx + 4λ * a s x, D(s) = 0, σλ * as = 2λ * as + c exp(−ρs) and
In Example 1 both the objective function and the market dynamics are linear continuous mappings from strategy space to the real line. According to the Generalized Weierstrass Theorem there exists an optimal strategy. One such strategy is given in Equation (13). The Pontryagin maximum principle cannot be used to find a closed-form optimal strategy for this system. where ζ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant discount rate over time interval [0, t], R(x) is the total revenue function such that it can be multiplicatively separable by d 2 /ds 2 as discussed in the Appendix, c is the constant cost multiplied by squared strategy function u(s). The main difference between this example with Example 1 is that, the strategy u(s) is a C 2 function and hence, we can calculate optimal strategy using Pontryagin's maximum principle. Assume the market dynamics of the firm follow
where b is a positive constant. We will use our method and the traditional Pontryagin maximum principle to find the optimal strategy of this Walrasian firm under a consumer good industry.
As the consumption of consumer goods increases exponentially, a Walrasian firm under this sector should face the market dynamics which shows the behavior in Equation (14) (Cohen, 2004; Remus, 2019) . Assume for a fixed Lagrangian multiplier λ * the g(s, x) function is an exponential function with the trend of Equation (14). That is g(s, x) = λ * exp(sbx − d). Equation (11) yields
and
Equation (10) yields a cubic strategy function u such that,
, and the optimal Walrasian strategy becomes,
and B 0 (s, x) = 0. The important part of this result is that we start with a g(s, x) function such that it is a C 2 function within [0, t] and we get the optimal strategy by solving a cubic equation. For comparison, Walrasian optimal strategy under Pontryagin maximum principle is found by Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) 
.
Example 3. Suppose that a pure Walrasian firm in the consumer goods industry has the objective function where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant discount rate over [0, t], R(x) is the total revenue function, and c is the constant cost multiplied by squared strategy function u(s).
As we assume the the firm is pure Walrasian, the market dynamics it faces does not depend on the strategy and has the form
where b and σ are two positive constants. For the Quantum approach assume g(s, x) = λ * exp(sbx) for a fixed Lagrange multiplier λ * (Cohen, 2004; Remus, 2019) . Equation (11) yields
Therefore,
The right hand side of Equation (10) becomes zero and the Walrasian optimal strategy is φ * w (s, x) = 0. The corresponding Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman Equation is
After solving for the right hand side of Equation (15) we get φ * w (s, x) = 0. In this example we conclude that if the trend of the market dynamics does not depend on u(s), there is no optimal strategy under both of quantum approach and Pontryagin maximum principle.
Another important example considers problems involving European call options, which have been well studied in finance, and provide the basis for the Black-Scholes formula and further generalizations by Merton-Garman. In the generalized approach the stock volatility is stochastic and is derived by a parabolic partial differential equation (Baaquie, 1997; Merton, 1973) . As constructing a Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes impossible in this case, methods of theoretical physics have been applied to get an optimal solution (Bouchaud and Sornette, 1994) . For example, the Feynman-Kac lemma has been used in Baaquie (1997) and Baaquie (2007) to find a solution of a Merton-Garman-Hamiltonian type equations using the Dirac bracket method Bergmann and Goldberg (1955) . In Proposition 2 we use a path integral approach to a situation where the firm's objective is to maximize its portfolio subject to a Merton-Garman-Hamiltonian type stochastic volatility in an European call option with controls. Using the function g as defined for Proposition 1, the result given below provides an optimal investment strategy for this framework.
For this type of problem suppose that the firm has the objective of maximizing
where u(s) is the strategy, and H is the European call option price which is a function of the time s, the stock price of the security at time s is represented by K(s), and the volatility at time s is represented by V (s). It is assumed that the stock price and the volatility follow Langevin dynamics of the form
where µ 1 [s, u(s)] is the expected return of the security, µ 2 [s, u(s)] is the expected rate of increase in V (s), and B 1 (s) and B 2 (s) are standard Brownian motion processes such that the correlation between dB 1 (r) and dB 2 (s) is zero unless s = r for which case it equals a value γ ∈ [−1, 1].
Proposition 2 (Merton-Garman Hamiltonian Type Equation) . Suppose that a firm's objective portfolio is given by maximizing Π MG (u, t) with respect to the strategy u ∈ U . Let
An optimal Walrasian strategy is the functional solution of
is the transition wave function at time s and states K(s) and V (s) with initial condition Ψ 0 (K, V ) = I(K, V ).
Proposition 2 is the extension of the framework of Baaquie (1997) that accounts for the firm's portfolio and has drift and diffusion components that are functions of the feedback control system and considers an optimal Walrasian strategy.
Proposition 3 considers the case of the cooperative environment outlined in Definition 2.
Proposition 3 (Cooperative Pareto Optimality). A cooperative Pareto optimal solution for firm ρ where all the firms maximize the total dynamic profit Π P (u, t) subject to
with respect to ρ th firm's strategy, where Ψ s is the transition wave function defined as
with initial condition Ψ 0 (x) and f is defined as
where D x is the gradient vector and H x is the Hessian matrix.
Example 4. Suppose that a firm under a Cooperative Pareto system has the objective function
where r ∈ (0, 1] is a constant discount rate over time interval [0, t], p > 0 is constant price, α ρ is the weight corresponding to ρ th firm such that k ρ=1 α ρ = 1, x ρ is ρ th firm's total output, c is a positive constant marginal cost for each firm, and u ρ is the total expenditure on advertising of the ρ th firm. Consider market dynamics
where x and u both are k-dimensional vectors such that x ρ ∈ X and u ρ ∈ U ρ ∈ U , a is a k × k-dimensional constant symmetric matrix, σ is an m-dimensional constant vector and B is an m-dimensional Brownian motion process. For a given Lagrangian multiplier λ * assume g(s,
Equation (17) implies,
,
Example 5. Consider a resource extraction problem of two players as discussed in the Section 7.2.1 of Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) . Suppose, there are two players with objective function
In the above problem u ρ ∈ U ρ ∈ U is the control strategy vector of player ρ for ρ ∈ {1, 2}, a and b are positive constant scalar, σ is an m-dimensional constant, α 0 1 ∈ [0, ∞) is the optimal cooperative weight corresponding to player 2 and B(s) is am m-dimensional Brownian motion. Here [k ρ u ρ (s)] 1 2 is player ρ's level of satisfaction from the consumption of the resource extracted at time s and c − ρu ρ (s)x − 1 2 (s) is the dissatisfaction level brought about by the cost extraction. Finally, k 1 , k 2 , c 1 , c 2 are positive constant scalars.
(i) Quantum approach: For a given fixed Lagrange multiplier λ * and a positive constant scalar d assume g(s,
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Equation (17) gives us the cooperative Pareto optimal strategy of two players as
(ii) Pontryagin maximum principle: From Example 7.2.1 in Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) we get cooperative Pareto optimal strategies of two players as,
where for s ∈ [0, t] the value function is
Finally, we find optimal strategy of the ρ th firm using a non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium. We assume that a firm is rational in decision making and earns more profit at the cost of the profit of the other firms in the market. Hence, Firm ρ seeks to maximize
with respect to the strategy u ρ where u * −ρ (s) is the optimized strategies for firms other than the ρ th firm.
Proposition 4. A non-cooperative Nash optimal solution for maximizing Π N (u, t) subject to
where Ψ s is the transition wave function defined as
Example 6. Consider an economy endowed with a renewable resource with k ≥ 2 firms such as in section 2.6 in Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) . We can compare our Nash equilibrium strategy through quantum approach with traditional Pontryagin maximum principle in Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) 
Finally, Equation (18) implies the feedback Nash Equilibrium as
From section 2.6 of Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) we know, the feedback Nash equilibrium from Pontryagin maximum principle is
where V ρ and V q are the value function of firms ρ and q with their gradients D x V ρ and D x V q respectively. By Corollary 2.6.1 in Yeung and Petrosjan (2006) Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman system has a solution
where A(s) and B(s) satisfies,
Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1
The arguments here are based on the use of the quantum Lagrangian action function. Further details are given in the Appendix. Equation (1) Chow (1996) from Equation (40), the Euclidean action function is,
Let ε > 0, and for a normalizing constant L ε > 0 from Lemma 2 in the Appendix, let
where Ψ s (x) is the value of the transition function at time s and state x(s) with the initial condition Ψ 0 (x) = Ψ 0 . Fubini's Theorem implies that the action function on time interval
This conditional expectation is valid when the strategy u(ν) is determined at time ν and the measure of firm's share x(ν) is known (Chow, 1996) . The evolution of a process takes place as if the action function is stationary. Therefore, the conditional expectation with respect to time only depends on the expectation of initial (19) and (20) yield
as ε → 0. Taking a first order Taylor series expansion on the left hand side of Equation (21) yields
For fixed s and τ let x(s) = x(τ ) + ξ and assume that for some 0 < η < ∞ we have |ξ| ≤ ηε x(s) so that 0 < x(s) ≤ ηε/ξ 2 . Furthermore, as our stochastic isoperimetric non-holonomic constraint follows Theorem 1 along with Assumptions 1, 2 in the Appendix, and dξ is a cylindrical measure where ξ contributes significantly, Ψ τ [x(ξ)] of Equation (22) can be expanded using a Taylor series of ξ around 0. Therefore, 
where ε → 0 and ∆x → 0. Define m = ξ − x(τ ) so that dξ = dm, then standard integration techniques can be used to show that
Assuming L ε = π εa > 0 and after expanding exponential function up to the first order we get,
The term b/(2a) is the ratio of the first derivative to the second derivative with respect to x of f . As f is in a Schwartz space, the derivatives of f are rapidly falling and they satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and therefore it is reasonable to we assume, 0 < |b| ≤ ηε and 0 < |a| ≤ 1 2 (1 − ξ −2 ) −1 . Hence, using x(s) − x(τ ) = ξ we get,
and therefore
Therefore, letting ε → 0, the Wick rotated Schrödinger type equation is,
If we differentiate Equation (23) with respect to u, then the solution of the new equation will be a Walrasian optimal strategy in the stochastic case. That is,
Therefore, an optimal Walrasian strategy is found by setting Equation (24) equal to zero obtains,
A unique solution to Equation (23) can be found using a Fourier transformation, as Ψ s (x) = I(x) exp[sv(x, u)], which can be verified by direct differentiation.
Proof of Proposition 2
Euclidean action function is,
Following arguments similar to those used to prove Proposition 1, define ∆s = ε > 0, and for L ε > 0 Lemma 2 in the Appendix implies,
as ε → 0 where Ψ s (K, V ) is the wave function at time s and states K(s) and V (s) respectively with initial condition Ψ 0 (K, V ) = Ψ 0 . The action function in [s, τ ] where τ = s + ε with the Lagrangian is,
with initial conditions K(0) = K 0 and V (0) = V 0 , where λ 1 and λ 2 are two Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the two constraints. The conditional expectation is valid when the strategy u(ν) is determined at time ν, and hence only depends on the initial time point of this time interval. Let ∆K(ν) = K(ν + dν) − K(ν) and, ∆V (ν) = V (ν + dν) − V (ν), then Fubini's Theorem implies,
Because K(ν) and V (ν) are Itô processes, Theorem 4.1.2 of Øksendal (2003) implies that there exists a function g[ν, K(ν), V (ν)] ∈ C 2 ([0, ∞) × R × R) that satisfies Theorem 1 in the Appendix, Assumptions 1 and 2, such that Y (ν) = g[ν, K(ν), V (ν)] where Y (ν) is an Itô process. If we assume
Equation (26) becomes,
Itô's Lemma and Equation (27) of Baaquie (1997) imply as ε → 0. Therefore,
For fixed s and τ suppose that K(s) = K(τ ) + ξ 1 , and V (s) = V (τ ) + ξ 2 . For positive numbers η 1 < ∞ and η 2 < ∞ assume that |ξ 1 | ≤ η1ε K(s) and |ξ 2 | ≤ η2ε V (s) . Here, security and volatility are K(s) ≤ η 1 ε/ξ 2 1 and V (s) ≤ η 2 ε/ξ 2 2 , respectively. Furthermore, Theorem 1 and Assumptions 1, 2 in the Appendix imply (16), then
Assume that f is a C 2 function, then
as ε → 0 and ∆u → 0. Define m 1 = ξ 1 − K(τ ) and m 2 = ξ 2 − V (τ ) so that dξ 1 = dm 1 and dξ 2 = dm respectively so that
, imsart-generic ver. 2014/10/16 file: manuscript.tex date: February 24, 2020 and m = m 1 m 2 ,
where we assume that Θ is positive definite, then the integrand in Equation (28) becomes a shifted Gaussian integral,
where v T 1 and m T are the transposes of vectors v 1 and m respectively. Therefore,
such that inverse matrix Θ −1 > 0 exists. Similarly,
Equations (29), (30) and (31) imply that the Wick rotated Schrödinger type equation is,
as ε → 0.
Therefore, the Wick rotated Schrödinger type Equation is,
Therefore, the solution of
is a Walrasian optimal strategy, which has the form Ψ s (K, V ) = exp {−sf [s, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , u(s)]} I(K, V ).
As the transition function Ψ τ s (K, V ) is the solution to Equation (32), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
The Euclidean action function for firm ρ under Pareto optimality in real time [0, t] is,
Following the arguments for the proof of Proposition 1, we have where τ = s + ε.
As x(ν) is an Itô process then from Theorem 4.1.2 of Øksendal (2003) we know there exists a p-dimensional vector valued function g[ν, x(ν)] ∈ C 2 ([0, ∞) × R n ) that satisfies Theorem 1 in the Appendix, Assumptions 1 and 2, and Y (ν) = g[ν, x(ν)] where Y (ν) is an Itô process. Assume
as ε → 0, then the generalized Itô's Lemma implies,
where σ ij [s, x(s), u(s)] represents {i, j} th component of the variance-covariance matrix, and we used the conditions ∆B i ∆B j = δ ij ε, ∆B i ε = ε∆B i = 0, and ∆x i (s)∆x j (s) = ε, where δ ij is the Kronecker delta function. Hence 
Let x(s) nk×1 = x(τ ) nk×1 +ξ nk×1 and assume ||ξ|| ≤ ηε[x T (s)] −1 for some η > 0. Following previous arguments imply
Expanding f [s, ξ, u(s)] and defining m nk×1 = ξ nk×1 − x(τ ) nk×1 so that dξ = dm, first integral on the right hand side of Equation (33) becomes,
Assume there exists a symmetric, positive definite and non-singular Hessian matrix θ nk×nk and a vector w nk×1 such that,
The second integral on the right hand side of Equation (33) becomes,
So that
For any finite positive number η we know x(τ ) ≤ ηε|ξ T | −1 , and there exists
Taking ε → 0, the Wick rotated Schrödinger type equation is 
Proof of Proposition 4
Following Chow (1996) the Euclidean action function of firm ρ in [0, t] is,
Let ∆s = ε > 0, and for L ε > 0 from Lemma 2 in the Appendix, the transition wave function of firm ρ is
for a time interval [s, s + ε] where ε → 0 and Ψ ρ s (x) is the value of firm ρ's transition function at time s and states x(s) with initial conditions Ψ ρ 0 (x) = Ψ ρ 0 . In Equation (34), R n represents n-dimensional strategy space of firm ρ. Let ∆x(ν) = x(ν + dν) − x(ν) then the Euclidean action function of firm ρ is,
By Theorem 4.1.2 of Øksendal (2003) we know there exists a p-dimensional vector valued function g ρ [ν, x(ν)] ∈ C 2 ([0, ∞) × R n ) that satisfies Theorem 1 in the Appendix, Assumptions 1 and 2, and
Equation (35) 
where 
Let
Equation (36) then
where we assumeθ n×n the symmetric, positive definite and non-singular Hessian matrixθ
Similarly,
Assuming L ε = (2π) n /(ε|θ|) > 0, the Wick rotated Schrödinger type equation is,
For any finite positive number η we know x(τ ) ≤ ηε|ξ T | −1 , and there exists a 
Discussion
In this paper we use a Feynman type path integral method to find optimal strategies for dynamic profit functions quadratic in time with a stochastic differential market dynamics for infinite dimensional vector spaces (i.e. Walrasian equilibrium) and finite dimensional vector spaces (i.e. Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium). In Proposition 2 we show in the generalized non-linear case like the Merton-Garman-Hamiltonian (Baaquie, 2007; Merton, 1973 ) Equation we are able find an optimal strategy where traditional Pontryagin's maximum principle does not work. Furthermore, in Example 1 where both the profit function and market dynamics are linear to strategy we are still able to find optimal strategy of a firm. Again in this case, we cannot use Pontryagin's maximum principle because after doing differentiation with respect to control, the strategy term vanishes and optimal strategy cannot be found. According to the Generalized Weierstrass Theorem we know solution exists when both the objective function and market dynamics are linear in terms of control (Intriligator, 1971) . Under Proposition 4 we calculate a non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and in the future we plan to extend this result to cooperative Nash equilibria. Assume Equation (1) is in Euclidean free field and it satisfies three conditions in above Theorem 1. Hence, the measure dξ is cylindrical and the feasible set of Equation (1) Following Chow (1996) at time s ′ ∈ [0, t ′ ], the stochastic Lagrangian function is
where λ is the non-negative Lagrangian multiplier, 
Multiplying both sides of Equation ( The integration defined in Definition 4 may not converge absolutely, and we need following definition (Fujiwara, 2017) .
Definition 5. For ε > 0 consider a family of C ∞ , ω ε (x) which follows the properties given in Definition 3.1 of Fujiwara (2017) . The Wick rotated wave integral is
as long as (i) For any family of ω ε (x) the integral I(ω ε ) converges absolutely and, (ii) The right hand side limit of Equation (2) exists and independent of choice of {ω ε }.
After using Proposition 3.1 in Fujiwara (2017) and Definition 5 we conclude integral I(Ψ) in Definition 4 is absolutely convergent.
Assumption 2. Suppose, x ∈ X such that; (i) The Euclidean action A(x) is a C ∞ function. If |α| ≥ 1, then there exists a positive constant C α such that, 
where A is the space of all paths that connect x(0) to x(t) and D x is a uniform measure on the space A. 
where A sj−1,sj (x) is the Euclidean action function in [s, s + ∆s] and it is the Euclidean action function of τ j . If Equations (41)-(43) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 then the following limit exists Ψ 0,t (x) = lim |∆|→0 I(∆, x, s, s + ∆s).
